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Scharff: When Is a Copyright Registered?

WHY AND HOW THE ISSUE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION
MADE ITS WAY UP TO THE SUPREME COURT
Justin Scharff*
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most powerful tools an author can wield is a
properly registered copyright. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 Pursuant to its powers in the
Constitution, Congress enacted the first copyright laws in 1790 to
promote and protect creative works.2 Congress enacted the Copyright
Act of 1976 to address copyright protection of creative works to keep
up with the emergence of some of America’s greatest technological
innovations.3 The Copyright Act not only responded to some of the
toughest intellectual property questions,4 but it also provided
* B.A. in Political Science, St. Joseph’s College, J.D. Candidate 2020, Touro College Jacob
D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I would like to thank my family for supporting me through my
journey in law school. They have been there for me every step of the way, and there are not
enough words in the dictionary to describe how appreciative I am for their unwavering support.
I would also like to thank Editor-in-Chief, Michael Morales, for all of his help throughout this
process. He provided invaluable feedback and instruction throughout every draft of this Note.
Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for all of her
assistance. Her expertise in copyright proved to be more valuable than I would have ever
imagined.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:19 (Sept. ed. 2018); see also id. §
1:45.
3 See H.R. REP NO. 94-1476 (1976).
4 The Copyright Act of 1976 dealt with the explosive growth of new media—television,
phonographs, and motion pictures to name a few. See Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856, 856 (1978). Furthermore, these types of media
gained the ability to be disseminated far and wide, a phenomenon that the Copyright Act of
1909 was unable to handle. Id. The Copyright Act of 1976 removed some of the needless
formalities around obtaining a copyright, which made it easier for people to copyright their
work. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.01 (rev. ed.

1319

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 [2018], Art. 19

1320

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

numerous incentives for those who registered their copyrights with the
Copyright Office.5 One of the most alluring incentives was, and still
is, the ability to institute an action for copyright infringement.6
However, for the purposes of bringing an infringement suit, when is a
copyright registered?
Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a),7 no civil action for copyright
infringement can be instituted until preregistration or registration of
the copyright claim is made in accordance with the Copyright Act of
1976.8 Although Congress mandates the registration of a copyright
prior to a plaintiff’s bringing a copyright infringement suit, Congress,
through several amendments to the statute, has failed to explicitly
define when a copyright is registered.9 The courts have developed two
conflicting approaches to determine when a copyright is registered for
bringing copyright infringement suits. The two approaches are the
registration approach and the application approach.
Proponents of the registration approach argue that registration
of a copyright is only satisfied after the Copyright Office rules on the
copyright application, either accepting or rejecting the application.10
The Tenth Circuit and, more recently, the Eleventh Circuit support this
approach.11 On the other hand, advocates of the application approach
argue that registration is satisfied when the applicant deposits the
appropriate materials in the Copyright Office together with the

2018). This trend of removing unnecessary formalities continued with America’s adherence
to the Berne Convention in 1989. See 134 CONG. REC. H.29661, 30103 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1988).
5 Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides exclusive rights to those who hold a
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). These include the ability to reproduce the copyrighted
material, create derivative works, distribute the copyrighted material, and publicly perform
and display the copyrighted work. Id.
6 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
7 Id.
8 Id. The registration requirement only applies to works created in the United States. Id.
Foreign works are exempt from this requirement. Id. See also discussion of pre-registration
infra Part III.A.
9 See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 13 (1988); see also Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897,
103d Cong. (1993).
10 See Robert Kasunic, Copyright from Inside the Box: A View from the U.S. Copyright
Office, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 318 (2016); see also 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 17:78 (Sept. ed. 2018).
11 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010); see also Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338,
1339 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018).
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application.12 The application approach is supported by the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits.13
The Eleventh Circuit is the latest circuit to address the issue of
copyright registration. In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. WallStreet.com, LLC, the plaintiff filed a copyright infringement lawsuit
before the Copyright Office ruled on its copyright application.14 The
court held that the statutory language of the Copyright Act made it
clear that registration of a copyright occurs only after the Copyright
Office affirmatively acts on the applicant’s copyright application.15
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case was not only correct, but
it also deepened the split between circuits. The registration issue pitted
two circuits against two others, creating a perfect platform for the
United States Supreme Court’s analysis. As a result of this split, on
June 28, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the
registration issue presented in Fourth Estate.16 The Supreme Court
finally has the opportunity to resolve the issue of registration under the
Copyright Act.
The author will argue that the registration approach is the
correct interpretation of the Copyright Act based on plain language,
legislative history, and public policy. The author predicts that the
Supreme Court, based on the statutory language of the Copyright Act,
will favor the registration approach and hold that in order to institute a
civil action for copyright infringement, one must have a copyright that
the Copyright Office has accepted or rejected. In its analysis, the
Supreme Court should read the applicable statutory sections in pari
materia.17 When read in conjunction with each other, the statutes
demonstrate Congress’s clear intent for the Copyright Office to rule on
a copyright application before the requirements for registration are
satisfied. The consistent statutory language and scheme of the
Copyright Act indicate that the Copyright Office must act
12 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4; see also Brief of amicus curiae The Copyright
Alliance in Support of Petitioner, Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571), 2018 WL 4252021.
13 See Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1984); see also
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010).
14 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1339.
15 Id. at 1341.
16 See Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018).
17 See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (stating that “the rule of in pari
materia—like any canon of statutory construction—is a reflection of practical experience in
the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally uses a particular word with a
consistent meaning in a given context”).
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affirmatively before a registrant is entitled to the benefits provided by
the Copyright Act. This view is also supported by the extensive
legislative history of the Copyright Act.18 The registration approach
balances Congress’s goal of creating a robust federal registry and
ensuring that all works meet the requirements of the Copyright Act.
This author argues that the Supreme Court should determine that
registration is only satisfied after the Copyright Office rules on the
copyright application. If the Supreme Court rules otherwise, it is vital
that Congress amend the Copyright Act to uphold the registration
requirement. Through amendments to the Copyright Act, Congress
has created specific statutory rights that not only properly incentivize
registration, but also give power and authority to the Copyright Office.
“[I]f merely delivering the material were all that is required, the
Copyright Office would have no need for its almost 100-person
examining corps, which could be replaced by a few mailroom clerks
whose duties would be limited to stamping a receipt date.”19 The
registration requirement ensures that each copyright is examined by
officials who specialize in copyright law and any deficiency is dealt
with before the case reaches the court.
This Note will examine the registration issue currently before
the Supreme Court. Part II will discuss the pertinent statutory sections
that the Supreme Court will inevitably analyze to determine what
constitutes registration for infringement purposes. Part III will
examine the circuit split regarding the copyright registration issue and
the circuit courts’ reasoning for supporting either the registration
approach or application approach. Part IV will analyze the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Fourth Estate. Part V will argue that the
registration approach is the correct approach based on the plain
language of the pertinent statutory sections discussed in Part II,
congressional intent, legislative history, and public policy. Finally,
Part VI will conclude the Note and predict that the Supreme Court will
affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.

18
19

See discussion of the legislative history infra Part II.A.
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10.
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RELEVANT STATUTORY SECTIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATION ISSUE

The issue of registration is fairly complex because different
courts have used several different, yet pertinent, sections of the
copyright statutes to support either the registration approach or
application approach. These statutory sections deal with copyright
protection, the role of the Copyright Office, and the importance of
registration. This Part will discuss the relevant statutory sections
surrounding copyright registration.
A.

17 U.S.C. § 411(a): Copyright Registration Needed
For Copyright Claims

The statutory section at the forefront of this legal issue is 17
U.S.C. § 411(a). This section states:
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights
of the author under section 106A(a), and subject to the
provisions of subsection (b), no civil action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work
shall be instituted until preregistration or registration
of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit,
application, and fee required for registration have been
delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to
institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof,
with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register
of Copyrights.20
Although the first sentence of section 411(a) succinctly states
that one cannot institute a civil action until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with
the title, section 411(a) fails to define the term “registration.” This
undefined term has created the split among the circuit courts discussed
throughout this Note. If the Supreme Court adopts the registration
approach, then a copyright is registered when the Copyright Office
examines and rules on the copyright application. However, if the

20

17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
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application approach is adopted, then a suit for infringement can be
brought as soon as an applicant deposits the required materials.
Congress has continuously revised section 411(a) in various
congressional sessions.21 One of these sessions, which focused on the
potential adoption of the Berne Convention,22 dealt with the
elimination of formalities in obtaining and enforcing copyright
protections.23 A Senate Judiciary Committee reported that it was
concerned that the requirements set forth in section 411(a) were
incompatible with the goals of the Berne Convention.24 However, the
sitting Congress ignored its report and chose to leave the registration
requirement of section 411(a) intact.25
Instead of removing the registration requirement entirely, the
amendment exempted foreign works from the registration
requirement.26 This ensured that foreign works would be protected and
enforceable at fixation. Critically, Congress kept in place the
registration requirement for domestic works.27 This amendment shows
that registration for domestic works was not a useless formality, but
one that Congress intentionally chose to keep in place for domestic
works.28 This is highlighted in a joint explanatory statement from
members of Congress which stated that the amendment “reaffirm[ed]

21 See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 13 (1988); see Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897,
103d Cong. (1993).
22 The Berne Convention is a set of international rules and regulations and is followed by
most of the global community. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 2971 and as amended Sept. 28,
1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989).
One of the main goals of the Berne Convention was to eliminate formalities surrounding
copyrights. See id.
23 One of the primary reasons behind eliminating needless formalities in the Copyright Act
was to prevent people from losing their statutory remedies because of a draconian formality
that had no place in modern society. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4.
24 See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 14 (1988). One goal in particular was the abolition of
formalities throughout copyright law. Id. The Committee believed that the registration
requirement was one of these formalities that needed to be removed from the Act in order to
comply with the Berne Convention. Id.
25 One member of Congress reasoned that the amended bill was a compromise. See 134
CONG. REC. H.29661, 30103 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). While
many formalities would be eliminated, the registration requirement would be upheld. Id.
Congressman William Moorhead explained that “[the bill] create[ed] a two-tier solution to the
registration issue. Registration is continued as a prerequisite to suit by domestic authors. Only
foreign origin works are excepted from the registration requirement.” Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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the importance of registration—to the public, the Library of Congress,
the judiciary, and the copyright community—and its ongoing
validity.”29
B.

17 U.S.C. § 410(a) and (b): Affirmative Power of
the Copyright Office to Register or Reject a
Copyright Application

17 U.S.C. § 410(a), which helps flesh out the legal issue, deals
with the affirmative power of the Copyright Office. This section
states:
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights
determines that, in accordance with the provisions of
this title, the material deposited constitutes
copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and
formal requirements of this title have been met, the
Register shall register the claim and issue to the
applicant a certificate of registration under the seal of
the Copyright Office. The certificate shall contain the
information given in the application, together with the
number and effective date of the registration.30
This statutory section details the affirmative steps that the
Copyright Office must take before it registers a copyright. Section
410(a) dictates that the Copyright Office shall register the claim after
it examines the claim and the applicant deposits the appropriate
material.31 The Copyright Office must examine the material and
determine whether the deposited material adheres to the strict
requirements of the Copyright Act. After the claim is registered, the
Copyright Office will issue a certificate of registration.32 An amicus
brief for Authors and Educators explains it well: “If an application
alone was needed for registration, then there would not be a need for
defining ‘registration’ in Section 410(a) as an action after an
examination has occurred.”33
29

Id. at 30105.
17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Brief for Authors and Educators as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fourth
Estate Public Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571), 2018
WL 5263259, at 16.
30
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Furthermore, this section allows the Copyright Office to act as
a filter for the courts and effectuate judicial economy. By examining
each copyright application on an individual basis, the Copyright Office
is able to weed out frivolous lawsuits that would clog up the court
system. The only cases that can be brought are the ones that have
passed through the strict scrutiny of trained copyright officials.
Additionally, 17 U.S.C. § 410(b) gives the Copyright Office
the power to refuse registration. This section states:
In any case in which the Register of Copyrights
determines that, in accordance with the provisions of
this title, the material deposited does not constitute
copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid
for any other reason, the Register shall refuse
registration and shall notify the applicant in writing of
the reasons for such refusal.34
The Copyright Office’s power to refuse registration highlights
an important flaw in the application approach. If, in accordance with
the application approach, registration is satisfied solely by depositing
certain materials, the power of refusal would be superfluous, rendering
this section of the statute meaningless. Under the application
approach, the Copyright Office’s refusal could come months after the
litigation started. This would often result in a court’s not being able to
hear the Copyright Office’s expert determination on copyrightability,
which would not only greatly weaken the overall purpose of the
Copyright Office, but the Copyright Act as well.
C.

17 U.S.C. § 410(d): Effective Date of Copyright
Registration

17 U.S.C. § 410(d) deals with the effective date of registration.
This section states that “[t]he effective date of a copyright registration
is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later
determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent
jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in
the Copyright Office.”35
While some courts interpret this as a statutory section that
ignores the registration requirement set forth in sections 410(a) and
34
35

17 U.S.C. § 410(b).
Id. § 410(d).
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411(a),36 statutes need to be read in pari materia. Therefore, “it is not
logical to assume that the relation-back provision [in § 410(d)]
subsumes the explicit requirements of § 411 and § 410(a).”37 This
statutory section is Congress’s acknowledgement and solution to
potential bureaucratic delays by the Copyright Office.38
D.

17 U.S.C. § 408(a): The Process of Obtaining
Registration

Finally, 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) provides for the requisite
information that the Copyright Office needs for consideration of a
copyright application. This section states:
At any time during the subsistence of the first term of
copyright in any published or unpublished work in
which the copyright was secured before January 1,
1978, and during the subsistence of any copyright
secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or
of any exclusive right in the work may obtain
registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the
Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section,
together with the application and fee specified by
sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a
condition of copyright protection.39
Section 408(a) instructs that the owner of a copyright may
obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the
Copyright Office the deposit, application, and fee. While some courts
claim that this statutory section supports the application approach,40
those courts ignore the specific language of section 408(a). The phrase

See Forasté v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.R.I. 2003) (reasoning that “[t]he
plain language of this statutory provision suggests that the registration occurs on the day the
Copyright Office receives all of the necessary application materials (application, deposit, and
fee)” (emphasis in original)).
37 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1204 n.9. Furthermore, this statutory scheme of retroactive
dating can be found in other statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018) (stating that once trademark
registration is granted, the date of registration retroactively dates back to the date of the
application or the intent to use application).
38 See H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976) (explaining that 410(d) “takes account of the
inevitable time-lag between receipt of the application and other material and the issuance of
the certificate”).
39 17 U.S.C. § 408(a).
40 See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
36
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“may obtain” shows that delivery is simply another step in the process
of obtaining registration. If registration was satisfied on delivery, the
language of section 408(a) would read “shall obtain.”41
Moreover, the language in section 408(a) addresses the timing
of protection under the Copyright Act, not the timing of enforcement.
The statute protects any person who files an application, fee, and
deposit. However, the enforcement of that protection can only be
brought after the Copyright Office responds to the application.42
III.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the registration approach for
handling the registration issue, which requires that the Copyright
Office rule on the copyright application before a civil action for
copyright infringement can be instituted.43 In contrast, the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits developed the application approach for handling the
registration issue, which requires mere delivery of the fee, the work,
and the application to the Copyright Office.44 In Fourth Estate, the
Eleventh Circuit deepened this circuit split by agreeing with the Tenth
Circuit’s registration approach.45 This Part will discuss the Tenth
Circuit’s registration approach and the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’
application approach.
A.

The Registration Approach

The registration approach, which is followed by the Tenth
Circuit and, recently, the Eleventh Circuit, relies heavily on the
statutory text of the Copyright Act. The registration approach requires
that the Copyright Office rules on a copyright application before an

41

Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
TVI, Inc. v. INFOSoft Techs., Inc., No. 4:06CV00697JCH, 2006 WL 2850356, at *4
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006).
43 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010).
44 See Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1984); Cosmetic Ideas,
Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010).
45 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (abrogating on the ground that registration is
not a subject matter jurisdiction limitation on the court).
42
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infringement suit can be filed. Support for this approach can be found
in La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire.46
The parties in La Resolana were La Resolana Architects, PA
(hereinafter “La Resolana”) and Angel Fire Home Design (hereinafter
“Clay Realtors”).47 A representative from La Resolana met with a
representative from Clay Realtors to discuss developing townhouses
in Angel Fire, New Mexico.48 During this meeting, La Resolana
alleged that it showed Clay Realtors architectural drawings and plans
that La Resolana created for potential townhouses in Angel Fire;
however, the parties were unable to come to a deal.49 A few years later,
La Resolana noticed that a townhouse owned by Clay Realtor looked
very similar to La Resolana’s architectural drawings, so it initiated a
copyright infringement action against Clay Realtors.50 At the time of
the filing of the lawsuit, La Resolana had submitted the required
materials set forth by the Copyright Act to the Copyright Office.51
However, the Copyright Office had not yet ruled on the application.52
As a result, Clay Realtors moved to dismiss the case.53
After Clay Realtors moved to dismiss but before the district
court ruled on the motion, La Resolana submitted a letter, allegedly
from the Copyright Office, that stated that the Copyright Office had
registered La Resolana’s copyright.54 However, the district court ruled
that this letter was hearsay because the letter could not be
authenticated.55 Therefore, because there was no evidence that La
Resolana registered its copyright, the district court reasoned that La
Resolana failed to meet the statutory requirement of section 411(a).56
As a result, the court dismissed La Resolana’s claim, and La Resolana
subsequently appealed.57

46

La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1200.
Id. at 1197.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1198.
54
Id. at 1197.
55 Id. at 1208.
56 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198.
57 Critically, Plaintiff did not appeal the District Court’s finding that the letter was
unauthenticated hearsay. See id. at 1208. This is important in understanding the Tenth
Circuit’s decision to affirm the lower court’s decision.
47
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The Tenth Circuit not only focused on the plain text of the
Copyright Act, but it also interpreted its legislative history and
analyzed public policy.58 The court noted that section 411(a) requires
affirmative action by both the applicant and the Copyright Office: the
applicant must deposit the required material and the Copyright Office
must rule on the application.59 The court stated that these actions
showed that satisfying the registration requirement is not as simple as
merely submitting an application; the Copyright Office must examine
the copyright application and rule before registration is satisfied.60
However, this is not the only statutory section that requires affirmative
action by the Copyright Office.
The court focused on the additional affirmative actions
required by section 410(a).61 The court explained that, under section
410(a), the Copyright Office must examine and register the copyright
before issuing a certificate.62 Furthermore, the court stated that similar
language can be found in section 410(b).63 This section allows the
Copyright Office to register the claim or refuse registration, which are
both affirmative acts required before registration is satisfied.64
The court also focused on the specific verb usage in section
408(a).65 This statutory section states that an applicant may obtain
registration after submitting all of the required material. 66 If
application was satisfied on mere application, the section would be
written “shall obtain” instead of “may obtain.”67 This section shows
that the application process is preliminary to the next step of
registration. After the material is deposited, the Copyright Office must
register or reject the copyright application.68
Finally, the court highlighted 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)’s statement
that a copyright owner is entitled to the remedies in the Copyright Act,

58

Id. at 1198-1208.
Id. at 1200.
60 Id.
61 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64
Id.
65 Id.
66 See discussion of § 408(a) supra Part II.D.
67 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F.
Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
68 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018).
59
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subject to the requirements set forth in section 411(a).69 The court
reasoned that “[t]his statutory language clearly instructs that a
copyright owner can sue for infringement only after the copyright is
registered, or registration is refused.”70
After the court analyzed the statutory sections, it examined the
two approaches to registration.71 The court first reviewed the
registration approach, and stated that it is in good company.72 In this
section of the opinion, it collected cases that supported the registration
approach through the years.73 The court noted that these cases focused
on the statutory language of the Copyright Act.74 After sifting through
those cases, the court analyzed the application approach.75 In this
section of the opinion, the court acknowledged the support for the
application approach by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well as Nimmer
on Copyright.76 The court then explained the basis of the application
approach.77
The court stated that allowing a person to initiate a copyright
claim as soon as an application is filed could help facilitate judicial
protection of copyrights.78 Furthermore, the application approach
considers registration as a needless formality79 because regardless of

69

La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201. The relevant portion of 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) states that
[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is
entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action
for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is
the owner of it. The court may require such owner to serve written notice
of the action with a copy of the complaint upon any person shown, by the
records of the Copyright Office or otherwise, to have or claim an interest
in the copyright, and shall require that such notice be served upon any
person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision in the case.
17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
70 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201.
71 Id. at 1203.
72 Id.
73 Id. The cases collected were Vacheron & Constantin–Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958), M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903
F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. Md. 2005),
Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc., 1996 WL 663880 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1996), and Loree
Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
74
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1202.
75 Id. at 1203.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1203-04.
78 Id. at 1203.
79 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1203.
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whether registration is accepted or rejected, one can still bring a suit.80
While the court admitted that these arguments have some appeal, the
court ultimately reasoned that the application approach ignored the
plain meaning of the Copyright Act as well as the legislative history.81
The court provided three reasons for why the application
approach’s statutory analysis is wrong.82 First, the court stated that the
application approach requires a “topsy-turvy” reading of the Copyright
Act.83 The Copyright Act does not confer different benefits on those
who submit copyright applications and those whose copyrights are
registered by the Copyright Office; these benefits are part of a single
package.84 Second, the court reasoned that Congress created
significant incentives to encourage registration of copyrights with the
Copyright Office.85 Every remedy in the Copyright Act is conditioned
on registration of the copyright.86 Finally, the court stated that the
application approach created shifting legal entitlements.87 The court
declared that “[i]f, for example, an applicant could obtain the
advantage of the presumption that the copyright is valid upon
application, see 17 U.S.C. § 408(c), but then, after examination the
Register of Copyrights determined the material is not copyrightable,
the presumption of validity would swing back and forth.”88 This would
create uncertainty in the law, which is at odds with Congress’s intent
when it enacted the Copyright Act.89

80

Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1204. The court acknowledged the arguments set forth by Nimmer and other courts.
Id. The court further stated that there could be times when a copyright was diluted because
the Copyright Office had not yet acted. Id. However, the court stated that “[w]hatever the
practical force of this argument, we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the statute, nor change
the legislative scheme.” Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1204.
85 Id.
86 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (stating that the right to file an infringement suit is subject
to the registration requirement of section 411); see also 17 U.S.C. § 502 (stating that a
copyright holder can obtain an injunction); § 501 (dictating that a prevailing copyright owner
can recover attorney’s fees). All of these remedies are available to those who file their claim
within the three-year statute of limitations period. See 17 U.S.C. § 507. While not discussed
by the court, prompt registration is the best way to avoid any conflict with the three-year time
limit set forth in § 507. Id.
87 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205.
88 Id.
89 Id.
81
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However, the court did not stop there. The court dove into the
world of congressional amendments and sessions by focusing on the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,90 which is a prime
example of Congress’s refusal to discard the vital requirement of
affirmative action by the Copyright Office.91 The goal of the Berne
Act was to eliminate unnecessary formalities when obtaining copyright
protection and ally the United States with the Berne Convention.92
While the Berne Convention Implementation Act was being
considered, a Senate Judiciary Committee expressed concern that
requiring registration of a copyright claim before a lawsuit could
commence was possibly an antiquated measure.93 The Senate
Judiciary Committee submitted a proposal to eliminate the registration
requirement.94 However, this proposal was swiftly rejected because
Congress intended to keep the registration requirement for domestic
works and wanted the Copyright Office to rule on every copyright
application.95
Instead, Congress eliminated the registration
requirement for foreign works only.96 The court pointed out that this
amendment is in line with the Berne Convention as the Convention
“does not forbid its members [from] impos[ing] formalities on works
first published in [their] own territor[ies].”97
The court also noted that Congress took up the issue of
eliminating the registration requirement in 1993.98 However, Congress
once again decided to keep the stringent requirement of registration
and rejected the proposal.99 The topic of registration came up once
again during the 2005 amendment to the Copyright Act. Through the

90

See S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988).
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205.
92 Id.; see also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2),
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 2971 and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989). The Berne Convention is a
set of international rules regarding copyright protection and enforcement, which eliminated
most of the formalities pertaining to copyright. See discussion of the Berne Convention supra
Part II.A.
93 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205.
94 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 14.
95 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206.
96
Id. at 1205.
97 Id. at 1208 n.11 (first and second alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-352, at
18).
98 Id. at 1206; see also Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993).
99 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206; see also Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 103d
Cong. (1993).
91
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Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005,100 Congress
amended the Copyright Act to add preregistration to 17 U.S.C § 411.101
Again, Congress kept in place the registration requirement of the
Copyright Act. The legislative history has consistently shown
Congress’s desire to keep the registration requirement set forth in §
411(a). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s granting of
Clay Realtor’s motion to dismiss in accordance with the registration
approach because the Copyright Office had not yet ruled on La
Resolana’s application.102
B.

The Application Approach

The Fifth and Ninth Circuits utilize the application approach.
This approach focuses less on the statutory text of the Copyright Act
and more on public policy and judicial economy. The first case that
supported the application approach was Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v.
Beard.103
Apple Barrel Productions, Inc (hereinafter “Apple Barrel”) and
R.D. Beard (hereinafter “Beard”) were both producers of country
music programs.104 Apple Barrel claimed that Beard’s performance
violated Apple Barrel’s copyright because the performance was
virtually identical to the show Apple Beard produced.105 The district
court denied Apple Barrel’s motion for a preliminary injunction.106 For
100

See Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, H.R. 357, 109th Cong. (2005).
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206-07. It is important to note that in most cases preregistration is not useful. See Preregister Your Work, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.cop
yright.gov/prereg (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). The only two scenarios where preregistration
is useful are where a copyright holder believes his or her work will be infringed before it is
published and where the copyright holder has started the work but has not finished it. Id. Even
in cases where a copyright holder preregisters, the work must be registered after the work is
published. Id. This shows that registration is still important to Congress. Id. See also Brief
for the United States as amicus curiae, Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com,
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571), 2018 WL 2264108, at 17 [hereinafter “Brief for
the United States”].
102 Interestingly enough, the court held that the March 10 letter would usually have been
enough to prove registration and survive a motion to dismiss. However, La Resolana did not
challenge the district court’s finding that the letter was unauthenticated hearsay. See La
Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1208. As a result, the court was forced to accept the fact that registration
had not occurred.
103 Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1984).
104 Id. at 386.
105 Id.
106 Id. The district court denied the preliminary injunction because the court believed that
Apple Barrel did not establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Id.
101
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the purposes of this Note, the only relevant holding of this case is that
Apple Barrel had standing to bring the claim even though the
Copyright Office had not ruled on Apple Barrel’s application.107 The
court stated that Apple Barrel only needed to deposit the appropriate
material, submit an application, and pay the fee to file a copyright
infringement suit with the court.108
The court based its decision heavily on arguments set forth by
Nimmer in his treatise on Copyright.109 However, Nimmer’s supposed
endorsement of the application approach is misleading. In reality,
Nimmer does not support the application approach but instead prefers
a harmonized approach that takes elements from both legal theories.110
Nimmer argues that when cases arise that involve complex matters of
copyrightability, courts should “stay proceedings to allow the
Copyright Office to weigh in with its special expertise regarding
copyrightability of plaintiff’s work.”111
Furthermore, Nimmer bases most of his reasoning on public
policy as opposed to statutory text.112 This is highlighted by Patry’s
criticism of Nimmer: “No analysis of the language of the statute or its
purpose was undertaken.”113 While public policy may be important,
Nimmer’s treatise says next to nothing about the actual meaning of the
text of section 411(a). It is up to the courts to adjudicate and interpret
law, not legislate it. The court needs to apply the law as it is written;
it is not within the court’s authority to reinvent what it means to register
a copyright. Patry laments that “[i]t is a sad day when courts ignore
the statutory scheme and the views of the agency that drafted the
provision in question in order to make their own policy.”114
It took twenty-five years after Apple Barrel for another circuit
to endorse the application approach. This endorsement can be found

107

Id.
Apple Barrel, 730 F.2d at 386-87.
109 Id.; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][1][a].
110 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3][b][vi].
111 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3][b][vi]. Nimmer explains that cases
involving complex matters of copyrightability can arise in a wide spectrum of cases. Id. For
example, a complex matter of copyrightability could come up in cases involving geometric
shapes or “elastomeric filaments radiating from a core.” Id. In these cases, Nimmer argues
that the issue of copyrightability is best handled by the Copyright Office, “particularly to a
judge lacking previous exposure to higher copyright doctrine.” Id.
112 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10.
113 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10.
114 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10.
108
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in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp,115 where Cosmetic
Ideas, Inc. (hereinafter “Cosmetic”) created a piece of costume jewelry
in 1997 and began to sell it in 1999.116 Somewhere between 2005 and
2008, IAC/InteractiveCorp., Home Shopping Network, Inc., HSN LP,
and HSN General Partner LLC (collectively, hereinafter “HSN”)
began to sell an allegedly virtually identical piece of jewelry.117
Cosmetic filed an infringement suit after submitting its application to
the Copyright Office but before receiving acceptance or rejection from
the Copyright Office.118 The district court granted HSN’s motion to
dismiss, noting that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the case because the Copyright Office had not yet ruled on
Cosmetic’s copyright application.119
The court first focused on the statutory language of the
Copyright Act.120 However, unlike most other courts, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the statutory language was ambiguous.121 The court stated
that “[w]e are not persuaded that the plain language of the Act
unequivocally supports either the registration or application
approach.”122 As a result, the court turned to public policy.123
The court concluded that the application approach fulfilled
Congress’s goal of providing copyright protection while maintaining a
robust federal register.124 The court observed that the application
approach prevented a party from being in legal limbo because the party
was able to sue for infringement regardless of whether the Copyright
Office accepted or rejected the copyright application.125 The
application approach allows the applicant to sue after the submission
of the application and deposit of the appropriate materials.126

115

606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 614.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Notably, the district court granted the motion to dismiss based on the fact that there was
no subject matter jurisdiction. However, this was an incorrect conclusion as it went against
the decision made in Reed Elsevier. However, the Ninth Circuit did not stop its analysis and
continued on.
120 Cosmetic, 606 F.3d at 618.
121
Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 619.
125 Cosmetic, 606 F.3d at 619.
126 Id. at 620.
116
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Second, the court reasoned that the application approach
encouraged registration because the copyright holder still needed to
apply for registration of a copyright before initiating a claim for
infringement.127 Third, the court stated that the registration approach
was simply a needless formality that the Copyright Act of 1976 was
intended to eliminate.128 Fourth, the court explained that the possibility
of a delay caused by the Copyright Office could cause a party to lose
its ability to sue because of the three-year statute of limitations.129
Lastly, the court held that it made no sense to defer to the Copyright
Office when the “decision of whether or not to grant a registration
certificate is largely perfunctory, and is ultimately reviewable by the
courts.”130 As a result, the court reversed and remanded the case back
to the district court for further proceedings.131
The decision in Cosmetic Ideas ignored key statutory
provisions and legislative history. The court lamented that there were
possible scenarios where the statute of limitations would prevent
someone from bringing an infringement suit.132 However, as will be
discussed in Part V of this Note, the Copyright Office is already
prepared to deal with these scenarios.133 For example, the Copyright
Office provides an avenue of relief for those litigants who wait until
the very last moment to file for copyright registration. For a small fee,
the copyright application can be expedited and processed in five
business days.134 Furthermore, while the court called the registration
requirement a needless requirement, it ignored the fact that Congress
has consistently retained the registration requirement when amending
the Copyright Act.

127

Id.
Id.
129 Id. at 620-21.
130 Cosmetic, 606 F.3d at 621.
131 Id. at 622.
132 Id. at 620.
133 See discussion of Copyright Office infra Part V.
134 See CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, No. CV 2:16-CV-01762, 2016 WL 4425192, at *5 (S.D.W.
Va. Aug. 18, 2016), vacated, 318 F.R.D. 582 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 12, 2016) (vacating an order
because the plaintiff was entitled to amend the complaint). This expedited process protects
litigants who are dangerously close to missing the three-year statute of limitations period.
128
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THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FOURTH ESTATE

In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
the Eleventh Circuit endorsed the registration approach and deepened
the circuit split.135 Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation
(hereinafter “Fourth Estate”) is an organization that produces news
articles and licenses them to other companies to use, and WallStreet.com, LLC (hereinafter “Wall-Street”) is a news website.136
Wall-Street entered into a licensing agreement with Fourth Estate that
required Wall-Street to take down the licensed news articles from
Fourth Estate if it cancelled its account with Fourth Estate because
Fourth Estate retained the copyright in the articles.137 After WallStreet cancelled its account, it did not take down the news articles.138
As a result, Fourth Estate initiated a copyright infringement
claim against Wall-Street and its owner, Jerrold Burden.139 Fourth
Estate’s complaint alleged that it submitted the appropriate registration
materials to the Copyright Office.140 However, the Copyright Office
had not yet ruled on Fourth Estate’s copyright application.141 WallStreet moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Fourth Estate did
not satisfy the registration requirement set forth in § 411(a).142
A.

The District Court

The District Court agreed with Wall-Street and dismissed
Fourth Estate’s complaint without prejudice.143 Judge Scola, Jr.
reasoned that “because a plaintiff must first obtain registration for the
work at issue prior to initiating suit, the Court must dismiss Fourth
Estate’s claims for copyright infringement.”144
Fourth Estate
subsequently appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing
135

PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10.
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018).
137 Id. at 1339.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141
Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1339.
142 Id.
143 Id. (citing the district judge in Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 2016
WL 9045625, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2016)).
144 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, No. 16-60497-CIV, 2016 WL
9045625, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2016).
136

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/19

20

Scharff: When Is a Copyright Registered?

2018

WHEN IS A COPYRIGHT REGISTERED?

1339

that it satisfied the registration requirement set forth in section
411(a).145
B.

The Eleventh Circuit

In its appeal, Fourth Estate argued that, even though there was
previous case law146 in the Eleventh Circuit on the matter of
registration, the case law was not binding because of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick.147 Fourth Estate
contended that the decision in Reed Elsevier eroded the rationale used
to justify past Eleventh Circuit decisions.148 On the other hand, WallStreet argued that the Eleventh Circuit should be bound by its previous
decisions.149
After discussing the circuit split,150 the Eleventh Circuit bluntly
stated that filing a simple copyright application did not satisfy
registration.151 The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the statutory
language of the Copyright Act.152 The court first examined the
statutory language of section 410(a).153 In particular, the court
reasoned that the fact that registration occurs only “after examination
of an application necessarily means that registration occurs ‘[l]ater in
time than’ or ‘subsequent to’ the filing of the application for

145

Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1339.
See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990)
(stating that a lawsuit cannot be initiated until plaintiff has a registered copyright); see also
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that the Eleventh
Circuit adopted the registration approach in M.G.B. Homes).
147 559 U.S. 154, 169 (2010).
148 The Reed Elsevier case established that registration of a copyright pursuant to section
411(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement. See id. Fourth Estate contended that since previous
case law in the circuit held that the registration requirement was a jurisdictional limitation,
these cases should be ignored. See Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341. However, the registration
requirement is still a procedural precondition. See Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 157 (stating that
the registration requirement is a precondition to filing a claim).
149 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1340.
150 The court stated that the Eighth Circuit supported the application approach in its dicta,
the Seventh Circuit had conflicting case law, and the First and Second Circuits acknowledged
the split, but refused to adopt either approach. Id.; see also Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462
F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006); compare Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624,
631 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring that an application be submitted before a copyright infringement
suit can occur), with Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(stating that the copyright application must be granted or refused before a suit can be brought).
151 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341.
152 Id.
153 Id.
146
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registration.”154 Furthermore, the court stated that section 410(b) gives
the Copyright Office the power to reject copyright registration.155 The
court then posited that if simply depositing material satisfied
registration, then the Copyright Office would have no power to refuse
registration.156
The Eleventh Circuit was correct here. A proper reading of a
statute requires that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant.157 If the application approach was adopted, the
power given to the Copyright Office by section 410(b) would be
meaningless. The Copyright Office could not refuse registration if
registration was accomplished on mere application.
The court then addressed Fourth Estate’s argument that section
408(a) supported the application approach.158 The court swiftly
rejected this argument by stating that section 408(a) dealt with the
conditions required to potentially obtain registration.159 The section
has nothing to do with the timing of registration or the responsibilities
of the Copyright Office.160 Finally, the court stated that contrary to
Fourth Estate’s argument, section 410(d) supported the registration
approach.161 While section 410(d) states that the effective date of
registration is when the appropriate material was deposited, it also
makes clear that registration occurs after the Copyright Office
accepted the application.162 Section 410(d) is yet another example of
registration occurring only after examination by the Copyright Office.
After detailing the consistent statutory support for the
registration approach, the court considered Fourth Estate’s other
arguments.163 The first argument dealt with the three-year statute of
limitations stated in 17 U.S.C. § 507.164 Fourth Estate argued that
154

Id. (alteration and emphasis in original).
Id.
156 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341.
157 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
158 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341.
159 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C § 408(a) (2018) (providing that a deposit of the work is one of the
requirements to potentially obtain registration); see also 17 U.S.C. § 409 (detailing the
information required for the copyright application); see also 17 U.S.C. § 708 (requiring that a
fee be sent with the deposit and application in order to potentially obtain registration).
160
Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1342.
163 Id.
164 The statute states that no civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this
title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.
155
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because the statute of limitations is only three years, it would be
harmful to potential litigants to have to wait for the Copyright Office
to accept or reject their application.165 However, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected this position by stating that the statute of limitations was just
another method that Congress used to incentivize registration.166 The
short statutory period fits the statutory scheme that encourages
registration of a copyright. Support for incentivizing registration can
also be found elsewhere in the Copyright Act.167
The court highlighted 17 U.S.C. § 410(c), which states, “[i]n
any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or
within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate.”168 This is yet another example of Congress’s
encouraging prompt registration of a copyright.
The court ended its analysis by declining to address Fourth
Estate’s arguments of legislative history and public policy. 169 The
court succinctly reasoned that if the legislative command was
straightforward, there was no need to go into the legislative history to
cloud a statutory text.170 In certain cases, the statutory text can be
enough. The decision by the Eleventh Circuit was a strong defense of
the registration approach. The Eleventh Circuit held that the statutory
text of the Copyright Act clearly stated that registration is only satisfied
after the Copyright Office ruled on the copyright application.171 As a
result, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Fourth Estate’s
complaint.172

165

Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1342.
Id. See also discussion of statute of limitations infra Part V.
167 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010) (stating that every remedy outlined in the Copyright Act is conditioned upon a
copyright owner’s obtaining registration); see also 17 U.S.C. § 502 (stating that a registrant
can obtain an injunction); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (stating that a prevailing copyright owner can
recover attorney’s fees).
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
169 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1342.
170 Id. If the court delved into the legislative history of the Copyright Act, it would have
come down even more strongly on the side of the registration approach. Some of the most
persuasive arguments favoring the registration approach come from the legislative history.
See discussion of legislative history supra Part II and infra Part V.
171 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1342.
172 Id.
166
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The court used the appropriate statutory sections to support the
registration approach. One of the strongest parts of the court’s analysis
involved the statute of limitations. The court correctly identified
section 507(b) as yet another incentive created by Congress to
encourage early registration.173 However, to strengthen its position,
the court should have discussed that for a small fee, the Copyright
Office will expedite an application.174 This shows that if there is a need
for urgency, the Copyright Office is able to decide the matter in five
business days.175 Moreover, if this solution is not enough, proponents
of the application approach should lobby Congress to provide an
exception for those who wait until the end of the statutory provision.
It is up to Congress, not the courts, to legislate.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit should have analyzed the
legislative history and public policy that supported the registration
approach. Even though it is evident from the statutory language of the
Copyright Act that registration is only satisfied by action by the
Copyright Office, it is still important that the courts interpret the
legislative history and analyze public policy. It would have made an
already strong case for the registration approach even more persuasive.
If the Supreme Court finds the statutory language ambiguous, the next
step of statutory analysis will involve legislative history. There is
ample support for the registration approach in the legislative history
and public policy.176
V.

WHY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
A.

In Pari Materia

The Eleventh Circuit’s focus on the statutory text of the
Copyright Act should be the baseline from which the Supreme Court
begins. When interpreting a statutory text, it is vital to first examine
the statutory language.177 Here, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed each
173 Id. (stating that the three-year statute of limitations in § 507(b) encourages prompt
registration).
174 See 37 C.F.R. § 201.3(d)(7) (2018) (stating that the special handling fee is $800).
175 See CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, No. CV 2:16-CV-01762, 2016 WL 4425192, at *5 (S.D.W.
Va. Aug. 18, 2016), vacated, 318 F.R.D. 582 (S.D.W. Va. 2016) (vacating order because the
plaintiff was entitled to amend the complaint).
176 See discussion of legislative history supra Part II and infra Part V.
177 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (stating that the first step in
statutory construction is examination of the language of the statute); see also Kingdomware
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statutory section that is pertinent to the registration debate. The court,
much like the Tenth Circuit in La Resolana, reasoned that when the
statutory sections are read in pari materia, a coherent line of logic is
formed that dictates that registration is only satisfied when the
Copyright Office acts affirmatively.178
Sections 410(a) and 410(b) give the Copyright Office the
explicit power of registration.179 An applicant must first deposit his
work, application, and fee with the Copyright Office.180 After this, the
Copyright Office will examine the deposited material and issue either
an acceptance or rejection.181 This is the role that Congress, via the
Copyright Act, explicitly delegated to the Copyright Office. 182 The
registration approach allows the Copyright Office to exercise its full
power granted by Congress.
B.

Legislative History

However, even if the Supreme Court finds the statutory
language to be unclear, the registration approach is thoroughly
supported by legislative history. The Copyright Act of 1909183
included a registration requirement similar to that of the Copyright Act
of 1976. The Copyright Act of 1909 required that “[n]o action or
proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any
work until the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of
copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with.”184
Courts consistently held that under the Copyright Act of 1909, an
infringement suit can only be brought after a certificate of registration
was obtained.185 This requirement was kept in the Copyright Act of
1976 over sixty years later.
Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (stating that statutory construction
starts with the language of the statute).
178 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010);
179 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018); Id. § 410(b).
180 § 410(a).
181 § 410(b).
182
§ 410(a).
183 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (1909).
184 Id. See also Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 17.
185 See Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 18 (detailing that the Second Circuit
explained that “the 1909 Act required compliance with statutory provisions governing
‘“registration of [the] work”’ as well as with those governing ‘“deposit of copies,”’ and that
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One of the goals of the Copyright Act of 1976 was to eliminate
formalities surrounding copyrights.186 However, Congress retained the
requirement that works needed to be registered by the Copyright Office
before a suit for copyright infringement can be instituted.187 The
House Report for the Copyright Act of 1976 stated “[t]he first sentence
of section 411(a) restates the present statutory requirement that
registration must be made before a suit for copyright infringement is
instituted.”188
The report highlighted the importance that Congress placed on
the registration requirement. Congress affirmed that the requirement
was not a formality that it sought to eliminate but was something that
it intended all applicants to do. It was a necessary procedural step to
have the Copyright Office rule on a copyright application before a
lawsuit could be commenced. This dedication to the registration
requirement can also be found when Congress considered the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988.189 As previously discussed,
the Berne Convention was a set of international rules regarding
copyright law.190 While Congress exempted foreign works from the
registration requirement, it kept the stringent requirement that the
Copyright Office register all domestic works before a lawsuit can be
commenced.191 This amendment not only brought the United States
into conformity with the requirements of the Berne Convention, but
kept the registration requirement of section 411(a).192 The application
approach seeks to ignore this legislative history under the guise of
public policy.
This dedication to the registration requirement can again be
seen in 1993 when Congress took up the question of whether to remove
the registration requirement.193 Congress decided to keep the
registration requirement in place and rejected the proposal that would
have removed registration from section 411(a).194 This is yet another
the court could ‘think of no other added condition for “registration” but acceptance by the
Register.’”).
186 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4.
187 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). See also Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 18.
188 H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976).
189
See S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988).
190 See discussion of the Berne Convention supra Part II.A.
191 134 CONG. REC. H.29661, 30103 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988).
192 Id.
193 See Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993).
194 Id.
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example of Congress purposefully upholding the registration
requirement.
However, this was not the last time that Congress considered
the topic of registration. In 2005, Congress amended section 411(a) to
include pre-registration in the statute.195 The Copyright Office stated
that the purpose of pre-registration is “to allow an infringement action
to be brought before the authorized commercial distribution of a work
and full registration thereof, and to make it possible, upon full
registration, for the copyright owner to receive statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees in an infringement action.”196 Not only did this
amendment keep the registration requirement in place, but it also
added a subcategory for works that require immediate protection. The
2005 amendment is just another example of Congress’s steadfast
commitment to the registration requirement of section 411(a).
Furthermore, the application approach would virtually
eliminate the usefulness of pre-registration. According to the
Copyright Office, “[it accepts] preregistration of unpublished works
that are being prepared for commercial distribution for types of works
that the Register of Copyrights determined have had a history of prerelease infringement.”197 If registration was satisfied as soon as the
appropriate deposit, fee, and application were submitted, there would
never be a need for pre-registration since a potential suit would never
be delayed.198 The application approach once again is inconsistent
with a specific statutory section.
C.

Public Policy

The requirement that the Copyright Office must affirmatively
rule on a copyright application before a lawsuit can commence
prevents frivolous cases from clogging up the judicial process. The
Copyright Office acts as a filter and certifies that only legitimate claims
reach the courts.199 Moreover, the Copyright Office is a bastion of
institutional knowledge when it comes to the Copyright Act. Nimmer
describes the Copyright Office as “the governmental agency that

195

See Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, H.R. 357, 109th Cong. (2005);
see 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018).
196 See Preregister Your Work, supra note 101.
197 Preregister Your Work, supra note 101.
198 Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 17.
199 Kasunic, supra note 10.
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possesses special expertise in determining the bounds of copyright
protection,” which “could be of great value to the court (particularly to
a judge lacking previous exposure to higher copyright doctrine).”200
Furthermore, the Copyright Office not only deals with the legal
and formal requirements of the Copyright Act, but also determines the
“copyrightability, the appropriateness of the claim or facts stated in
conjunction with the examination of the deposit, the sufficiency of the
deposit, and many other statutory or regulatory nuances of
registration.”201 Then Solicitor General Elena Kagan said it best:
“Congress evidently intended the Register’s expertise to serve as a
resource to courts adjudicating copyright claims and contemplated an
active role for the Register in certain infringement suits. The Register
cannot perform those functions when copyright owners do not present
their works for registration.”202 The application approach deprives
courts of the legal findings of a highly specialized governmental office
that deals solely with copyrights. This denial of the Copyright Office’s
authority would impact the integrity of the robust registry that
Congress intended to create.
The Copyright Office is responsible for scrutinizing each and
every part of a work to ensure that it is copyrightable.203 As a result,
the court gives much more deference to copyright claims that are
registered by the Copyright Office.204 This is a direct result of the
prima facie validity that results when a copyright is registered within
five years of publication.205 Moreover, while Congress wanted to
create a robust registry, it also intended the works to be genuinely
copyrightable.206 This process allows for not only a robust registry,
but also a registry that is filled with genuinely copyrightable works.207
Furthermore, the Copyright Office assigns different rights to
applicants depending on whether registration is granted or refused. An
applicant whose copyright is registered has different statutory rights
200

NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3][b][vi].
Kasunic, supra note 10, at 319.
202 Brief for the United States as amicus curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand, Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2009) (No. 08-103), 2009 WL 1601031, at *24.
203 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 315.
204
Kasunic, supra note 10, at 322.
205 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 322.
206 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 321.
207 Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae in Support of Respondents,
Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571),
2018 WL 5096054, at 8.
201
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from one whose copyright application is denied. Moreover, if the
application approach were to be followed, courts would be robbing the
Copyright Office of clear statutory rights in cases that result in refusal.
Associate Register of Copyrights Robert Kasunic stated:
In particular, the statute allows the plaintiff who files
an infringement suit based on a refused application to
file, only upon notice, on the Register (and under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Department of Justice) of
the initiation of the action for infringement and a copy
of the complaint, and provides the Register with a
statutory right to intervene in the action for
infringement.208
If the application approach were to be followed, there would be
no need to provide notice to the Copyright Office that a lawsuit is being
commenced. This is because the lawsuit would be initiated before the
Copyright Office rules on the copyright application. This is yet
another statutory right that the application approach ignores.
Critically, allowing the highly specialized Copyright Office to
affirmatively act on an application before registration is satisfied
provides little to no delay in the litigation process. While some courts
claim that this drags out the litigation process and conflicts with the
three-year statute of limitations,209 those courts ignore a crucial
function of the Copyright Office. As discussed, for a small fee, the
Copyright Office can expedite the examination of a claim for
applicants involved in pending or prospective litigation.210 This
examination is completed within five business days.211 As a result, not
only is there little-to-no judicial delay, but the Copyright Office is able
to rule on the application in a timely manner. This, coupled with the
relation-back provision of section 410(d), protects the applicant while
the Copyright Office is making its ruling. If public policy dictates that
this is unacceptable, it is up to the constituents to appeal to Congress
to provide an exemption in certain scenarios.
If this is truly a problem that plagues potential litigants, it is the
role of Congress to change the law, not the courts. In a brief for the
208

Kausnic, supra note 10, at 319.
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
210 See CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, No. CV 2:16-CV-01762, 2016 WL 4425192, at *5 (S.D.W.
Va. Aug. 18, 2016), vacated, 318 F.R.D. 582 (S.D.W. Va. 2016) (vacating order because the
plaintiff was entitled to amend the complaint).; see also 37 C.F.R. 201.3(d)(7).
211 Id. at 5.
209
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United States as amicus curiae, the United States stated that “the text
of Section 411(a), and of the Copyright Act as a whole, is the best
indication of the balance between competing objectives that Congress
sought to draw. Any adjustment of that balance is properly entrusted
to Congress rather than to this Court.”212 Whether it was in 1976, 1988,
1993, or 2005, Congress has taken an active role in addressing
registration and has repeatedly and intentionally premised the
commencement of copyright infringement suits on copyright
registration by the Copyright Office.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The statutory text, legislative history, and public policy make
it clear that the registration approach is the correct interpretation of the
Copyright Act. This approach recognizes the consistent commitment
by Congress to retain the registration requirement for domestic works.
All of these sections should be in the forefront of the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the appropriate approach to registration. The Supreme
Court should recognize the consistent statutory language and clear
legislative history and declare that registration is only satisfied after
the Copyright Office rules on the application. In addition to being
consistent with the overall statutory scheme of the Copyright Act, the
registration approach better promotes the purposes of copyright law.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision and adopt the registration approach as the law of the land.

212

See Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 22.
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